5992214
9781416559252
CHAPTER 1 American 11, Do You Hear Me? Boston Center, Nashua, New Hampshire, 7:59 a.m. American Flight 11 receives takeoff clearance at 7:59 and is handed over from the controllers at Logan to the FAA's Boston Center after reaching 11,000 feet. The plane appears on Pete Zalewski's radar screen just after passing through 20,000 feet, and he radios the flight crew climb and course instructions. "American 11, turn 20 degrees right." "20 right. American 11," comes the prompt reply from the cockpit. "American 11, now climb/maintain flight level 3-5-0," Zalewski continues, instructing them to head up to 35,000 feet. He receives no response. "American 11," he repeats, "climb/maintain flight level 3-5-0." Still nothing. "American 11, Boston," he radios, requesting a call back from the pilots. "American 11, uh, the American on the frequency, how do you hear me?" Again, there is no response. When a crew is handed off to a new controller, they're given a new frequency and are expected to check in right away. In this case, either the pilots aren't paying attention, Zalewski thinks, or, more likely, there is something wrong with their radios or perhaps with the frequency. Airliners have two primary radios for communicating; each can transmit on two frequencies, one that is active and another that is normally inactive. The pilot simply has to flip a switch to go between the two radios, or between the inactive and active frequencies. They usually listen to just one frequency at a time, and they can hear all the communications between the controller and other aircraft on that frequency. They can also listen to both active frequencies available to them simultaneously, although that gets confusing, like having a phone to each ear. If a crew doesn't check in right away, it's usually because they've accidentally tuned to the wrong frequency or because they got the frequency information wrong. In that case, they just go back to the previous frequency and ask for a clarification. Such mishaps are not uncommon, and it usually doesn't take a crew much time to get onto the correct frequency. Zalewski wonders if the pilots have returned to the frequency of their last sector, so he calls them on that frequency, but they're not there. Next he tries them on the emergency or "Guard" frequency, 121.5. This frequency is reserved for emergency communications with aircraft in distress, and airline crews usually monitor it continuously on their secondary radios. Zalewski figures the American 11 pilots should hear him if he calls them on that. But again he gets no response. He then tries several more times on the normal frequency, but to no avail. Zalewski is getting concerned, but not overly so. His radar tells him that the plane is still on course and the pilots have not yet changed their transponder to the "loss of radio" code, 7600. They may not yet realize that they have fallen out of the loop. If theyareaware, Zalewski is confident that the crew is working on the problem. "American 11, this is Boston Center. How do you read?" he repeats again and again. "American 11, if you hear Boston Center...please acknowledge." He begins systematically running through a checklist in his mind, trying to recall all the eventualities that might account for the loss of communication. The crew may be significantly distracted or dealing with some problem on the aircraft. In a worst-case scenario, he figures, they may have experienced a failure in their avionics equipment or some other electrical problem. There doesn't seem to be any issue on his side of the equation; his other flights are hearing him just fine. He reports to his supervisor that American 11 is not responding, and then, at 8:14, just as the flight is officially labeled "NORDO," no radio contact, the plane's transponder signal is turned off. This is rare, and not a good indication at all. No pilot would turnSpencer, Lynn is the author of 'Touching History' with ISBN 9781416559252 and ISBN 1416559256.
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