Ethics and the Future of Conflict Lessson from the 1990s

It is tempting to think of 1991-2001 as the "post-Cold War" decade. As such, it is a transitional period, a relatively benign time when the great powers paused before a new mortal challenge appeared. Such an interpretation is terribly mistaken. While the Persian Gulf War and the interventions in Somalia, Haiti, and the Balkans will inevitably register as relatively minor episodes in the broad sweep of American history, tectonic changes occurred in the 1990s that will be felt for years to come. All of the fault lines that look so dangerous today preceded the earthquake of September 11, 2001. The agenda for the future has been hidden in plain sight for quite some time. In geopolitical terms, the question of ethics and force is now largely about the values and goals of the United States. As the predominant military force in the world--far exceeding the capabilities of even the most advanced industrialized nations--the United States has demonstrated its willingness and capability to deliver lethal force to enforce a stable and predictable world order. The key concept for the next decade is the same as the last: asymmetry. Asymmetry--a situation in which the combined military and economic power of one state creates a radical imbalance in power--is the result of American political will as well as the fruit of American technology. Americans have made it a priority to conduct research and development in military systems ranging from precision-guided munitions to satellite intelligence-gathering and missile defense. In political terms, Americans have also signaled willingness, beyond any other nation or group of nations, to spend the resources necessary to purchase and deploy these sophisticated systems. While this willingness might be reaching new heights after September 11, again, the pattern is nothing new. One place where the pattern of the past may take a new turn is in the tendency of American planners to minimize risk to U.S. forces, to engage in force protection or riskless war. Michael Ignatieff has written about "virtual war"--war in technological superiority allows all risk to be exported to the enemy. The current war against terrorism will put stress on this notion. Hard choices will need to be made regarding risk and reward. What is it worth--in terms of U.S. casualties--to apprehend elusive terrorists? What should be done when long-range bombing is not sufficient? For the moment, Americans are clinging to the benefits of virtual war with understandable tenacity. Another place where a familiar pattern will be tested is in the strict interpretation of noncombatant status and immunity. Military operations in the 1990s--largely humanitarian in nature--featured strong emphasis on maintaining the firewall between combatants and noncombatants. Human rights advocates and ethics critics often pointed to policies such as long-range bombing, dual-use targeting, and even the use of relatively indiscriminate economic sanctions as testing the limits of noncombatant immunity. But few doubted the intent of planners to limit collateral damage as much as possible. The struggle in the future will be over defining standards for "as much as possible." What is considered an acceptable amount of collateral damage in a war of self-defense might be different, and more permissive, than a war with humanitarian goals. For all of the new stressors on our familiar pattern, the ultimate purposes for resorting to force are likely to continue unchanged. In addition to self-defense and the pursuit of human rights goals, force will be used to punish and deter. Peacekeeping and peace enforcement are also likely to continue, as states will no longer be allowed to "fail." Failed states are obvious refuges for terrorists. In fighting what President George W. Bush has called the "axis of evil," there is pressure to put a face on that evil so that it caLang, Anthony F. is the author of 'Ethics and the Future of Conflict Lessson from the 1990s', published 2003 under ISBN 9780131839939 and ISBN 0131839934.